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of Facts contained in the appellant's Brief [See pp. 2-19 of
Appellant's Brief].
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The issues decided by this Court in its opinion filed
December 27, 1985, were properly before the Court and
appropriately decided.
This case is simply one where the petitioners do not like
the decision ot the Court and are using the provisions of Rule 35
to attempt to get the Court to change its mind.

All of the

arguments contained in the Petition for Rehearing were before the
Court prior to its filing of the December 27, 1985, opinion.

The

petitioners fail to show how any ot the issues raised were as a
result of this Court misconstruing or overlooking some material
fact, statute or decision which materially affected the results.
Therefore, this Court should deny the Petition for Rehearing;
and the opinion, as drafted, should stand.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THIS COURT PROPERLY CONSIDERED THE ISSUE OF
STROMBERGfS NEGLIGENT IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION.
The petitioners allege, "Even a cursory review of the Trial
Court record evidences the fact that plaintiff's theory of
liability did not include negligent implementation of the release
decision," and, as a result, the Court improperly issued its
ruling.

Taking a cursory review of the record in this case, one
- 2 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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finds that said issue was properly before the District Court, as
well as on appeal.
Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the First Claim for Relief of plaintiff's
Complaint states:
Ronald Stromberg and Ralph Garn were directors of the
Utah State Youth Development Center at all times
relevant hereto, and Russ Van Fleet and Jeff McBride
were the treatment plan and release coordinators for
the Utah State Youth Development Center at all times
relevant hereto, were responsible for the management,
supervision, and control over Arguelles' confinement,
treatment and released LEmphasis added] [Record on
Appeal, p. 4J
4'.
Said individuals were negligent in their conduct
as superintendents and treatment plan and release
coordinators respectively, as said conduct relates to
the confinement, treatment and decision to release
and/or parole Roberto V. Arguelles from the Youth
Development Center. [Record on Appeal, p. 4J
This Court held, in Blackham v. Snelgrove, 280 P.2d 453
(Utah, 195i) , that a complaint is required only to "... give the
opposing party fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds of
the claim and a general indication of the type of litigation
involved."
The appellant would urge the Court to review pages 12, 13
and 14 ot the appellant's Memorandum submitted in the District
Court, found at pages 312, 313 and 314 of the record on appeal.
A review of that argument clearly sets forth that the appellant
argued before the Trial Court that the defendants/petitioners
should be held liable for failing to follow their own release
requirements.

At page 12 [Record on Appeal, p. 312], the

appellant's Memorandum states:
- 3 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Therefore, it was a requirement for his release that he
attend counseling sessions with a professional
counselorc This never occurred. [Record on Appeal,
p. 31ZJ
U.C.A. ^64-6-8 gave to defendant Stromberg the full
power to retake the defendant [ArguellesJ into custody
when he found out that Gilmore was treating the
defendant. Prior to the date that Arguelles was
actually released, the defendant Stromberg was aware
that Gilmore was the therapist whom defendant Arguelles
would be seeing and he changed the language of the
release agreement as stated above. However, no action
was taken to insure that the defendant Arguelles would
see a "professional therapist" after his release.
There is no evidence to support the fact that Stromberg
had determined that the defendant Arguelles was well
established in such a therapeutic relationship with a
mature female therapist prior to his release, [Record
on Appeal, p. 313J
It is clear that if the facts as stated in the
respective Statements ot Fact are taken in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party, or the
plaintiff, that said facts could support a
determination that the defendants failed to follow the
criteria, rules, regulations and order for placement of
the defendant Roberto Arguelles outside of the YDC, and
therefore, the defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment
should be denied. [Record on Appeal, p. 318.1
At page 32 of appellant's Trial Court Memorandum, after quoting
§64-6-1.1, the appellant states:
The above-quoted language placed on the YDC and the
superintendent the duty to see that the "student" is
meeting the conditions of his placement; that is, to
see that the defendant Arguelles was receiving the
adequate treatment as required by his placement
agreement and as recommended by both Taylor, Judge
Garff and Janet Warburton. By the defendant's own
admission, they became aware through the officer of the
supervisor, as referred to in §64-6-1.1(5), that the
requirement of the release were not being met and that
the terms ot the treatment were not being carried out.
This placed on the superintendent the duty to see that
either the treatment was carried out as per the release
agreement or that the defendant Arguelles was returned
to the YDC. He did neither. The YDC, through their
- 4 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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agents, allowed the defendant Arguelles to continue in
his non-conforming conduct; the defendant Arguelles,
therefore, did not receive the treatment that was
necessary and required by the release agreement; and at
no time was the defendant seeing a "professional
counselor" as required by the release agreement. The
failure of the YDC through either the superintendent
Stromberg or his agent, the parole officer, Craig
Berthold, to act to require the defendant either to
obtain "professional counseling" as contemplated by
Judge Garff, Dr. Taylor and Janet Warburton, or to see
that he was returned to custody was not a discretionary
function, it was clearly an operational function.
[Record on Appeal, p. 332-333J
Finally, the Conclusion of the Memorandum states:
At trial, the plaintiff will prove that the attack by
the defendant Arguelles on the plaintiff1s ward was
caused directly and proximately by the failure by the
State of Utah, the YDC, and the State defendants to
comply with the Judgefs order and with their own
release requirements, and by their failure to see that
defendant Arguelles engaged in meaningful therapy.
LRecord on Appeal, p. 336J
In the State's Petition for Rehearing, the Attorney General
makes the assertion that the first time that the negligent
implementation of a discretionary function issue was raised was
in Point III of the appellant's Reply Brief.

However, a review

of the original Brief filed by appellant will show that this
issue is addressed in pages 16, 17, 18, 29, 30, 31 and 38. In
fact, at page 18 of the Brief of the respondent, the Attorney
General complains that, "Contrary to the implications in
appellant's Brief, there are not issues raised concerning the
amount ot supervision by the parole officer following the
release, the parole officer's role in implementing the parole
plan, or the failure to retake Arguelles into custody."
- 5 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Appellant sees the Attorney General's confusion being caused
by two problems:

(1) semantics; and (2)

the evolution of

language used by this Court in defining the "discretionary
function exception".

At the time of the Motion for Summary

Judgment before Judge Fishier, and at the tirae of the drafting of
appellant's Brief, this Court had not yet issued the decision of
Little v. Division of Family Services, 667 P.2d 49 (Utah, 1983).
In Little, this Court greatly clarified the law in the state of
Utah concerning the discretionary function exception.

At the

Trial Court and Brief on Appeal, petitioner was basically relying
upon the cases of Frank v. State, 613 P*2d 517, and Bigelow
v. Ingersoll, 618 P.2d 50 (Utah, 1980).

Both of those cases

basically defined a discretionary function as involving broad,
policy-making decisions.

The appellant argued that the decision

to release Arguelles, the actual release of Arguelles, the
treatment of Arguelles by Annette Gilmore, and the failure of
i

Stromberg to take action when he knew Arguelles was not complying
with the release agreement were all done on a case-by-case basis
and did not involve broad, policy-making factors; and, therefore,
they were "operational" and not "discretionary functions".
Although the appellant did not use the words "implementation of a
discretionary function11, the underlying theory was argued.
That issue was clearly before Judge Fishier in the District
Court and argued in the original Brief of the appellant.

After

the appellant filed her Brief, this Court issued the Little
- 6 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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v. Division of Family Services, supra, decision.

After that

decision came down and after the accusations made against the
appellant by the State in their Brief, the appellant's position
was clarified in Point III of the Reply Brief.
It is clear that the issue of defendant Stromberg and the
Statefs failure to see that the release criteria were complied
with was before the Trial Court and appropriately considered by
this Court on appeal, and that the petitioner has failed to state
with particularity any point of law or fact which this Court
overlooked or misapprehended in arriving at its opinion filed
herein.
POINT II
THE COURT'S OPINION IN DOE V. ARGUELLES IS A
REITERATION OF THE LAW IN THE STATE OF UTAH
CONCERNING THE DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION
EXCEPTION WHICH HAS BEEN IN EXISTENCE SINCE
1980.
The petitioner attempts to argue that the Court's opinion in
Arguelles eliminates the discretionary function exception to the
Governmental Immunity Act.

This is plainly incorrect.

The

holding in the Arguelles opinion is the same legal principle in
regard to the discretionary function that this state has had
since the Frank v. State, supra, opinion, decided in 1980; i.e.,
that decisions by State officials concerning broad policy factors
are discretionary and, therefore, protected; those actions
implementing the decisions on a case-by-case basis are not.

This

is the Court's holding in Arguelles; i.e., that the decision to
- 7 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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release Arguelles is protected, but once the State official
creates criteria by which a discretionary function is to be
implemented, they are bound to follow those criteria.

This is a

correct balance of protecting civil servants in decision making,
but holding them responsible to carry out decisions already madec
The flaw in the State's argument is that it presumes that
the State official can be held liable for implementing any policy
decision.

This misstates the Court's holding.

A State official

is only liable for negligently implementing a policy decision«,
There is simply no reason to protect a State official who
negligently fails to carry out an established decision at the
expense of a grievously injured citizen.
The State argues that all a plaintiff need do is plead
negligent implementation to thwart the application of the
Governmental Immunity Act.

This frenetic response to the

Court's decision ignores the fact that in order for a defendant
to avoid this statute, the plaintiff must not only plead, but
must prove, by a preponderance of evidence, that the State
official negligently implemented policy.

If the facts of a

particular case will not support a claim for negligent
implementation, then the State would be entitled to a Motion for
Summary Judgment under Rule 56.

An attorney representing a

plaintiff who makes an allegation in a complaint that has no
factual basis simply to avoid summary judgment would be in
violation of Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and
.

- 8 -
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the State would have the sanctions, under Rule 11, to deal with
that problem.

Further, the State would have the protection of

U.C.A. $78-27-56 for litigation initiated in bad faith.
In reality, the State's objection to this Court's opinion is
that this Court, as other Courts all over the country, is
increasingly requiring State officials to answer for their
wrongful conduct.

As this Court stated in Standiford v. Salt

Lake City Corp., 605 P.2d 1230 (Utah, 1980):
Finally, and not the least of our concerns, the
standard we adopt today to narrow governmental immunity
should allow more innocent victims injured by tortious
conduct on the part of public entities access to the
courts for redress. Fewer such people will be
mercilessly and senselessly barred from recovery for
their injuries sustained at the hands of the entities
designed to serve them.
The State defendants' denunciation of this Court's unanimous
decision is a reflection of the State's archaic position that
State employees should not have to answer for their misconduct.
This is simply not the law and has not been the law in the state
of Utah since the adoption of the Governmental Immunity Act in
1965, and is contrary to Article I, Section 11 of the
Constitution of Utah.
The defendants make the accusation that, "When courts take
it upon themselves to raise, argue and decide legal questions not
addressed by the parties, they risk overlooking important facts,
le^al considerations and practical consequences which may result
from a decision rendered without benefit of a complete record and
thorough briefing."

However, all the concerns raised by the
- 9 -
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State in its Petition were argued in the District Court and
raised in the Briefs.
argument.

The parties stipulated to waive oral

They cannot now complain that they had no opportunity

to argue the matter.

The fact that the Attorney General does not

like an opinion is not grounds for having the matter reheard.

As

this Court held in Beaver County v. Home Indemnity Co.5 52 P.2d
435 (Utah5 1935):
We cannot grant a rehearing for the purpose of dropping
out ot the opinion parts unsatisfactory to counsel and
leaving in other parts evidently satisfactory to
counsel. It the opinion is to be modified, it should
be modified because it fails correctly to state the
law, or for some other reason which makes its language
or statements improper or inapplicable.
The State argues that Stromberg had no authority over the
defendant and that he had to rely upon others; i e e 0 , parole
staff, to report violations in a quarterly report.

Further, the

report due from Arguelles' probation officer was not received
prior to the incident that gave rise to this lawsuit.

However,

this position flies in the face of the law of the state of Utah
in force at the time of the incident.

Section 64-6-8 gave to

defendant Stromberg full power to retake the defendant into
custody when he found out that the criteria for release were not
going to be met or, in the alternative, not to release Arguelles
until he could be assured that the release criteria were met.
Further, the parole officer who would be submitting the report
would be an officer of the supervisor referred to in U.C.A. *>646-1.1(5).
» 10 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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U.C.A. $64-6-8 gives defendant Stromberg the power to make
rules and regulations.

If Stromberg had to rely upon others to

get the information in order to make the decisions he was
obligated to make under the statute, then he had the duty to
promulgate such regulations and rules to ensure that he had
sufficient data to make the decision.

The appellant would submit

that requiring a quarterly report on so dangerous an individual
as Arguelles is patently absurd.
Stromberg knew that Arguelles was not following the release
plan before he left the YDC.

The release plan said "professional

counselor", and he was lined up to see Annette Gilraore, a
graduate student.

Dr. Taylor testified in his deposition that he

was concerned that Gilmore was not a professional.
on Appeal, pp. 218, 219, 272J

[See Record

As a result of this concern,

Annette Gilmore's name, which originally appeared on the release
agreement, was stricken and "professional counselor" was
inserted.
Stromberg had the power, pursuant to U.C.A. $64-6-8, to take
Arguelles oft the street if he was not complying with the order,
or not to release him at all if appropriate therapeutic services
had not been established.

It is simply no excuse to say that he

relied upon others to get his information.

He was the head of

the YDC; and under the doctrine of respondeat superior, the
negligence ot his inferiors is imputable to him.
Even assuming the defendants1 argument is correct inasmuch
- 11 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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as the supervision of defendant's therapy is outside Strombergfs
control, he still had the obligation to see that the terms of the
release agreement were in place before the release occurred.

He

knew that Annette Gilmore was not a professional therapist, as
required by the release agreement.

He knew that they were not

meeting weekly, and that Arguelles had not responded
satisfactorily to treatment before he was released.
had met only once with Gilmore before releasee
violation of the release criteria.

Arguelles

This is a clear

I.See Record on Appeal,

p. 264, 355, 218, 21yJ
The petitioner has failed to show that this Court overlooked
or misapplied some point of law or fact in its opinion; and the
Petition should, therefore, be denied.

It has been over six

years since the plaintifffs ward, Jane Doe, had her throat slit
by Roberto Arguelles.

This Court should not delay any further in

remanding this case for trial so that she can finally prosecute
her civil cause without any further unnecessary delay•
POINT III
THE DEFENDANTS' PETITION FAILS TO STATE ANY
REASON AT ALL WHY THE COURT SHOULD REHEAR THE
ISSUE OF QUASI-JUDICIAL IMMUNITY.
The defendants* Petition fails to state any reason at all
why the Court should rehear the issue of quasi-judicial immunity,
and the defendant should be entitled to pursue her claim of gross
negligence against defendant Stromberg.

Therefore, under no

circumstances should the Court rehear those issues.
- 12 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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CONCLUSION
It is clear that the defendants pled in their Complaint that
State defendant Stromberg and the State of Utah were responsible
for the management, supervision, and control over Arguelles1
confinement, treatment and release; that said individuals were
negligent in their conduct as it relates to the confinement,
treatment and decision to release and/or parole Arguelles from
the YDC; that the issue was argued, briefed and preserved at the
Trial Court, was raised on appeal by the Briefs of the parties,
and was appropriately considered by this Court; and that the
petitioners failed to demonstrate in any way, pursuant to Rule 35
of the Appellate Rules, that this Court overlooked or
misapprehended any point of law or fact.

Therefore, the Petition

for Rehearing should be denied.
DATED this

/Q

day of February, 1986.
HALEY & STOLEBARGER

GEORGE M^NtfAl
Attorney for Pl^a^htifffAppellant
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